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We propose to review the origin and  
development of the atomic hypothesis. 
By this is meant the idea that the pheno-
menal world around us is made up,  
ultimately, of minute constituent entities 
that cannot be further subdivided. These 
are the atoms. The hypothesis of atoms 
arose in two classical civilizations: Greek 
and Indian. The contribution of the Greeks 
is well known while that of Indians is 
hardly known. Accordingly, we will  
devote greater effort to explore the  
Indian contribution. 
 The first step in reducing the comple-
xity of the phenomenal world is to en-
quire if the apparently endless variety of 
objects, both living and non-living, could 
be explained in terms of a few basic con-
stituent elements. At least three ancient 
civilizations grappled with this question 
and came up with strikingly similar  
answers. Let us briefly recall these de-
velopments. 
 In the Western intellectual tradition, 
Thales is acknowledged to be the father 
of philosophy1. He lived in Miletus, a 
city in Asia Minor in present-day Turkey 
during the 6th century BCE. He is reputed 
to have predicted an eclipse that astro-
nomers estimate must have taken place in 
585 BCE. Thales surmised that the fun-
damental element constituting the world 
was water. A second member of the 
Milesian school, Anaximander (610–546 
BCE), hypothesized that the primary  
element was all-pervading, limitless, 
boundariless and eternal, which he called 
apeiron. Somewhat later, Anaximenes, 
also from the Milesian school, asserted 
that air was the primary element from 
which everything else is derived.  
Another Greek philosopher deserving 
mention is Xenophanes, who declared 
that everything is made up of earth and 
water1. The next important Greek philo-
sopher was Heraclitus1, according to 
whom fire was the primordial element 
that gave rise to everything else (note 1). 
Heraclitus flourished around 500 BCE 
(note 2) and was from Ephesus in Asia 
Minor. Finally, Empedocles advanced 
the idea1, in around 440 BCE, that the 
primary elements are four in number; 
these being water, earth, air and fire. 
This was accepted by all later thinkers. 
Aristotle did introduce a fifth element; 
however, it did not take part in the consti-
tution of objects around us (see below). 
 Philosophical speculation concerning 
the nature of things begins, in the Indian 
tradition, with the Upanisads. These were 
composed towards the end of the Vedic 
period, that is, around 600 BCE. In the 
Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad, perhaps the 
earliest of the Upanisads, it is stated that 
water is the primal element2. In fact, it 
goes on to state that out of water is born 
earth and then fire. In the Chandogya 
Upanisad space (akasa) is declared to  
be the primal element. Space is said to be 
the origin, support and the final end of 
all2. These explorations led to the con-
cept of five primary elements (pancab-
huta), as stated in the Taittiriya upanisad2. 
These elements are space (akasa), water 
(ap), fire (agni), air (vayu) and earth 
(prithvi). Each of these elements has its 
own characteristic property. Thus, space 
has the quality of sound (sabda), water 
that of taste (rasa), fire that of colour 
(rupa), air of touch (sparsa) and earth  
of odour (gandha). These qualities are 
associated with the fivefold scheme of 
sense organs, namely those of hearing, 
taste, sight, touch and smell respectively. 
It would thus appear that the concept of 
pancabhuta is essentially of empirical 
origin and not the result of pure specula-
tion. In the Svetasvatara Upanisad, the 
acceptance of the concept of five ele-
ments is implied2. 
 The Chinese analogue of the Greek 
and Indian ideas, sketched above, is the 
theory of five elements. This was deve-
loped sometime during 350–270 BCE, 
when Tsou Yen systematized the ideas 
that had been in vogue for more than a 
century3. The five elements are water 
(note 3), fire, wood, metal and earth. 
Each of these elements has an associated 
process that occurs in nature. Thus, water 
has the process that we describe as soak-
ing and descending. Fire has the process 
that we describe as blazing and uprising. 
Wood has the quality that permits straight 
edges or curved surfaces. Metal can  
follow the shape of a mould and then  
become hard. Earth allows sowing, 
growth and reaping. The five-elements 
concepts led to the idea of five colours, 
five flavours, five musical modes and 
other fivefold. 
 The four basic elements of Empedo-
cles are the same as the material ele-
ments of the Indian pancabhuta. The 
latter has also space. The use of space 
may have an element of prescience in 
that it might have led to the concept of 
‘atoms and void’ as constituting appar-
ently solid matter. Also, the upanisadic 
concept of space (akasa) bears striking 
resemblance with Anaximander’s 
apeiron. Further, akasa should not be 
confused with the concept of the Brah-
man (or Chinese concept of the Tao). 
The latter does not constitute anything, 
rather it is a principle that is immanent in 
and behind all things. At this stage it is 
useful to take note of a somewhat later 
development. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) 
introduced a fifth element, but only as a 
constituent of heavenly bodies. Accord-
ing to his scheme, the Earth is at the cen-
tre of the universe, above it is the Moon 
and beyond the moon is are the Sun and 
other heavenly bodies. The sublunar part 
of creation is made out of the four  
elements of Empedocles. The remaining 
heavenly bodies are made only out of the 
fifth element. The Chinese theory of five 
elements involves only material things; 
three of these, water, fire and earth,  
are the same as in Indian and Greek 
schemes; while the remaining two, 
namely, wood and metal, are distinct. 
This situation is probably connected with 
the very high level of technological de-
velopment achieved in China. 
 The fact that distinct civilizations 
reached similar conclusions is quite re-
markable. It is an intriguing question as 
to what it implies. If nothing else, it sug-
gests a certain universality of the human 
intellect in its endeavour to understand 
the workings of nature. 
 One cannot fail to notice a feature of 
the Indian scene; we cannot always asso-
ciate a name with an idea. A certain 
amount of reticence in claim-
ing credit for oneself seems to have been 
always present in the Indian tradition. 
Thus, from an analysis of the linguistic 
and literary styles, scholars have con-
cluded that the Bhagavad-Gita did not 
form part of the original epic Mahab-
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harata, but is a later insertion4. But who 
composed the Bhagavad-Gita? To cite 
another example, what is the name of the 
artist who created the exquisite kangra 
miniatures illustrating Jayadeva’s Gita-
Govinda? (note 4)5. For that matter, who 
is the painter responsible for the portrait 
of the musician Himmat Khan Kalawant 
playing the rudra-veena (note 5)6 – 
unquestionably a masterpiece in the 
realm of art? 
 The idea that an apparently continuous 
mass distribution consists really of dis-
crete atoms and space arose as follows. 
Let us first assume that matter cannot be 
destroyed or created (in the sense that 
was enshrined two millennia later in the 
Newtonian mass conservation law). Now 
it is something of elementary experience 
that a solid piece of material can be bro-
ken into two pieces. This implies that 
there must have been space in the mate-
rial along which the breakage proceeds. 
Another way of stating the same is this. 
If I insert a knife in a slab of butter, all 
that is happening is that, since no amount 
of matter can be destroyed, the knife has 
gone into the space that already existed 
in the slab. In other words, if the material 
was truly continuous, it would not permit 
a foreign body to be inserted into it; that 
is, it would offer infinite resistance to 
such an effort. If we imagine this process 
of breakage taking place repeatedly, we 
then come finally to a stage when further 
subdivision of our sample is no longer 
possible. We are left with entities that 
are indivisible and indestructible. These 
are the atoms. 
 The earliest explicit articulation of the 
atomic doctrine is from Pakuda Kaccha-
yana, a contemporary of the Buddha 
(566–486 BCE)7. He is briefly mentioned 
in the canonical Buddhist text Digha  
Nikaya (note 6)8, along with five other 
heterodox (those that reject the authority 
of the Vedas) preachers, who were leaders 
of their respective sects of recluses and 
laymen. This occurs in the course of a 
conversation between the King Ajatsatru 
of Magadh and the Buddha, wherein the 
king recalls his prior discussions with the 
six preachers. Here is a summary of Pa-
kuda’s teaching: ‘The following seven 
things are neither made nor commanded 
to be made, neither created nor caused to 
be created, they are barren (so that noth-
ing is made out of them), steadfast as a 
mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. 
They move not, neither do they vary, 
they trench not one upon another, nor 
avail aught as to ease or pain or both. 
And what are the seven? The four ele-
ments – earth, water, fire and air – and 
ease, and pain, and the soul as the sev-
enth. So there is neither slayer nor causer 
of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or 
explainer. When one with a sharp sword 
cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby 
deprives any one of life, a sword has 
only penetrated into the interval between 
seven elementary substances’ (note 7)9. 
 To get a feel for the intellectual fer-
ment of the time when the Buddha 
walked on this earth, we recall the five 
remaining thinkers mentioned in the 
Digha Nikaya. These are: Purana Kas-
sapa, Ajita Kesakambali, Makkhali  
Gosala (also Maskarin Gosala), Nigantha 
Nataputta and Sanjaya Belatthiputta. 
Other than Ajita, all accepted the prevail-
ing Indian concepts of transmigration, 
rebirth and the ultimate aim of release 
from the cycle of rebirth; and the associ-
ated law of karma. However, they re-
jected the need of any divine intervention 
for implementation of this law; all of 
them being atheists to a degree. Purana 
taught the doctrine that virtuous conduct 
(or lack thereof) had no effect on a man’s 
karma. Makkhali was the leader of a 
clan – Ajivikas – that survived for almost 
two millennia before becoming finally 
extinct. Ajivika teaching has many things 
in common with that of the Jains, as we 
will shortly discuss. Ajita was an un-
compromising materialist, probably the 
first in the Indian tradition, who rejected 
the idea of transmigration, rebirth and 
suchlike, and to whom a man’s death was 
the end of it all. Sanjaya was the skep-
tic – the doubting Thomas of his age – 
who denied the possibility of ever know-
ing anything for certain. Nigantha Nata-
putta is more famous under the name 
Vardhaman Mahavira (note 8) – the last 
in a line of 24 teachers (tirthankaras) in 
the Jain tradition. The Jain tradition sur-
vives and is a vital presence in the spiri-
tual landscape of India. 
 The heterodox doctrines of Ajivika, 
Jain and followers of the Buddha all  
accept the atomic hypothesis. For the 
former two traditions, it is difficult to 
decide exactly when the idea was pro-
pounded. Mahavira was a contemporary 
of the Buddha, but he is not considered 
to be the original teacher of the doctrine. 
He is, rather, a resuscitator who is  
believed to have revived a much earlier 
tradition. Gosala is supposed to have 
joined a band of recluses – the Ajivikas, 
and then finally taken over as their 
leader. In any case, the Jain cosmogra-
phy is as follows: the universe consists 
of the Jiva and Ajiva (not Jiva). Jiva is 
the aggregate of all the life-monads (note 
9); it is a substance of adjustable magni-
tude that can be housed, at a given time, 
in various objects such as plants, insects, 
animals and finally humans (note 10). 
Ajiva consists of space (three types, 
akasa, that which allows objects to be 
contained, and two others associated 
with motion and with rest), time and 
matter (pudgala). Pudgala appears in 
manifold forms, the ultimate stage of it is 
atomic. The atoms are all of only one 
type. The distinction between various 
material objects that we see around us is 
due to the different ways in which the at-
oms combine to make these objects. Fi-
nally, the individual atom cannot be 
detected with our sense organs; only in 
aggregates to they become amenable to 
detection. All these atoms and their  
aggregates are supposed to harvour life-
monads so that the Jain universe is one 
that is throbbing with life10. 
 The Ajivikas also take the atomic  
doctrine for granted, without fuss, with-
out much ado, just like the Jains. This 
probably implies, as Zimmer11 has argued 
so persuasively, that the idea itself has 
roots that go much further back, possibly 
to the pre-Vedic, pre-Aryan times. The 
main Ajivika concern is, however, with 
evolution. A life-monad starts out its 
journey inside an atom and then progres-
sively evolves via transmigration and  
reincarnation into vegetation and plant 
life, into stages of insect and animal lives 
and finally the stages in the human 
sphere. All the life-monads of the uni-
verse are laboriously treading along this 
path. After exactly eighty-four hundred
thousand existences comes the moment 
of liberation, automatically. The natural 
course of this evolution, controlled by an 
all-pervasive cosmic principle called  
niyati, cannot be influenced in any way 
by human intervention. Good deeds  
cannot hasten nor bad deeds impede the 
process of reaching liberation. It is here 
that the Ajivika doctrine differs from the 
Jain. According to the latter (as well as 
to the Hindu or the Buddhist doctrines), 
good deeds on the part of the individual 
do bring in rewards concerning the  
escape from the cycle of rebirth. Finally, 
it is interesting to note that the concept 
of eighty-four hundred thousand exis-
tences (Chaurasi lakh Janam) is present 
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even today, e.g. in the sacred book, Guru 
Granth, of the Sikhs, it is mentioned 
many times. 
 Let us now come back to the terra 
firma of Greek philosophy1. Leucippus 
of Miletus (440 BCE) is generally cred-
ited with the first formulation of the 
atomic hypothesis. However, we know 
very little of this somewhat shadowy  
figure; so much so that a later atomist, 
Epicurus, even doubted his very exis-
tence. In any event, the atomic hypothe-
sis was further developed by Democritus 
(around 420 BCE), who erected a fairly 
elaborate scheme of nature on this basis. 
We know of Democritus much better. He 
was a contemporary of Protagoras – the 
father of Sophism. Incidentally, the word 
sophist did not carry the somewhat unsa-
voury connotation that it has today. 
Originally it simply meant a philosopher 
or possibly a teacher of philosophy. 
 In the scheme of Democritus every-
thing in the world is made up of atoms 
and the void, with the void filling up the 
intervals between the atoms. The atoms 
are indivisible and cannot be destroyed 
or created. Atoms come in distinct types, 
infinite in number, their distinction aris-
ing out of differences in size and shape. 
Aristotle also attributes to the atomists 
the concept of heat associated with  
atoms; the spherical atoms that make up 
fire being the hottest. The idea of infinite 
variety of atoms is, quite clearly, the 
least attractive part of the scheme; since 
it abandons the eternal scientific quest of 
trying to explain the apparently limitless 
multiplicity in nature in terms of a  
few conceptual categories. Democritus’  
atoms are always in motion, somewhat 
like the picture presented in the modern 
kinetic theory of gases (at finite tempera-
ture). Sometimes two atoms will impinge 
upon each other, and if their shapes are 
compatible, will interlock to give rise to 
a more complex structure. Repeated oc-
currences of this sort are believed to 
have given rise to bulk matter. Finally, a 
word about Democritus theory of the 
soul. The soul consists of the finest and 
most mobile atoms and permeates the 
body wherein it is housed. It is the soul 
that produces the phenomenon of life. 
This concept is strikingly similar to the 
Jain concept of the Jiva that we dis-
cussed above. However, we recall that 
Jain Jiva is not atomic, only Ajiva is. 
 The next Greek atomist is Epicurus. 
According to him, the central purpose of 
human existence is to have pleasure. And 
pleasure arises, principally, from know-
ing how the world works. In other words, 
from knowledge of philosophy and the 
sciences, and the pursuit after such 
knowledge (note 11). Leading a life of 
pleasure will result in a state of tranquil-
lity (ataraxia) and freedom from fear of 
pain and death. In later times Epicurean-
ism came to be associated with unbridled 
pursuit of the pleasures of the flesh. This 
is almost certainly the result of smear 
hurled by the followers of rival, possibly, 
non-materialistic doctrines. It is interest-
ing to note that a similar development 
took place in India as well. The material-
istic tradition started by Ajita Kesakam-
bali was nurtured by a succession of 
teachers who came to be known as the 
Lokayata school. The last great figure of 
this tradition is Carvaka, who was suc-
cessfully turned into an object of ridi-
cule – one whose doctrine supposedly is 
‘of a contented stomach and no think-
ing’ – by his non-materialistic, theistic 
rivals. Epicurus apparently authored 37 
books, of which only fragments survive. 
Our knowledge of his teachings is almost 
entirely based on the work of the Roman 
poet Titus Lucretius Carus, who ex-
pounded the Epicurean doctrine in six 
books of Latin verse entitled De Rerum 
Natura12. Here, the atomic hypothesis of 
Democritus is accepted but not his con-
cept of atomic motion. Instead, the pic-
ture here is one of atoms perpetually 
falling through an infinite void, along 
parallel straight-line paths. On this is  
superimposed an additional random  
motion: occasionally an atom will ex-
perience a ‘swerve’ which will cause it 
to deviate from its original path and 
hence collide with another atom. If the 
shapes of the two atoms are compatible 
they would interlock, thus leading to the 
formation of a more complex (diatomic) 
structure. This process, repeated a suffi-
cient number of times, is believed to 
have led to the formation of the world. 
 Although the picture of ‘atoms falling 
through void’ is more poetic than scien-
tific and no explanation is provided as to 
the cause of the ‘swerve’ (ref. 12), the 
picture may still have a germ of truth in 
it. Consider a self-gravitating gas of par-
ticles ‘falling’ towards the centre of mass 
of the gas along rectilinear (but not par-
allel!) paths. Consider a superimposed 
motion, a swerve, due to thermal agita-
tion. Now we have a model for the for-
mation of a massive body. Having thus 
explained the birth of the world,  
Lucretius then goes on to advance the 
idea that life also owes its origin to the 
interaction of atoms, a staggeringly 
original and bold hypothesis for that 
time. At any rate, there is no ‘spark of 
life’ of divine origin. This was followed 
by a remarkably realistic portrayal of the 
life of early humans, as also the scien-
tific explanation of the phenomena of 
thunderbolts and volcanic activity. All 
these to free the human mind from the 
fear of whimsical actions of capricious 
gods. But this was not to be. The ration-
alist world-view of atomists would soon 
be replaced by Platonic phantasies and 
then by Old Testament fairy tales. 
Europe had to wait for a long time before 
rediscovering her Greek heritage. A 
somewhat similar development, concern-
ing the decline of the rationalist Weltan-
schauung, took place in India as well. As 
we have described in the foregoing, the 
idea of a life-monad undergoing succes-
sive stages of evolution was advanced by 
the Jain and Ajivika thinkers. The idea 
was also accepted by the Buddhists and 
the Hindus (note 13), although there 
were differences amongst them regarding 
matters of detail. The rationalist view-
point got eventually superceded by the 
creeping advance of orthodox, theistic 
dogmas. As a result, Indian thinking 
failed to rise from poetic indulgence to 
the level of critical enquiry that could 
lead to the development of science.  
Indeed, India continues to be under the 
thralldom of irrational superstitions. 
 Indian atomism reached its apogee in 
the Vaisesika sutra of Kannada9,10,14. 
This work is classified among the six  
orthodox (one that accepts the authority 
of the Vedas; or at least pays lip service 
to it, as the present work certainly does) 
schools of Indian philosophy. There is 
some uncertainty regarding the time of 
composition of this work. Most scholars 
agree that Vaisesika came after Buddha, 
whereas Roy (note 14)15 has argued that 
it precedes and, in fact, influenced the 
Buddha. In any case, Vaisesika is men-
tioned (note 15)16 in the Arthasastra – a 
treatise on theories of statecraft authored 
around 300 BCE by Kautilya, who was 
the Prime Minister of Chandragupta, the 
first emperor of the Mauryan dynasty at 
Pataliputra. Thus, we can safely ascribe 
the composition of Vaisesika sutra to the 
interval between 486 (Buddha’s death) 
and 300 BCE. 
 The concept of the atom is arrived at 
via the process of inference in Vaisesika. 
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It is a matter of common experience that 
a piece of gross matter can be divided 
and subdivided, with each subsequent 
piece maintaining the properties of the 
original sample. Can the process of divi-
sion be carried out ad infinitum? If the 
answer to this question is yes, then it 
would imply that every object is made up 
of an infinite number of constituent units 
and there will be no way of distinguish-
ing between a mountain and a molehill. 
Thus the process of continued division of 
an object must stop after a finite number 
of steps and the last constituent in this 
process is termed the atom (paramanu). 
Being further indivisible, they cannot be 
destroyed (or created). Thus an atom oc-
cupies a non-zero spatial volume. This 
then would account for the difference be-
tween a mountain and a molehill in terms 
of the difference in the number of their 
constituent atoms. It is also implicitly 
accepted that atoms are spherical objects; 
since nothing is said of their shape.  
Although of finite extension, an atom is 
too small to be visible; that is, to be 
amenable to direct observation through 
our sense organs. On the other hand, 
suitable aggregates of atoms are obvi-
ously visible. When does an aggregate 
begin to be visible? According to Vaise-
sika, there are exactly four types of  
atoms: those of water, fire, air and earth 
(pancabhuta minus space/aether). Two 
atoms of the same type can combine 
(conjoin) to form a dyad. Thus, there are 
four types of dyads. Three dyads of the 
same type form a triad. A triad is suffi-
ciently large in size to be visible, ‘as 
motes in a sunbeam’ (this striking im-
agery appears also in Lucretius). Triads 
of the same type as well as those belong-
ing to different types can form larger  
aggregates. It is out of the latter that the 
whole visible universe, including bodies 
of living objects, is made. 
 The picture of an atom in Vaisesika is 
thus one of a little hard ball. In that case 
how does a water-atom differ from a fire-
atom? Now, bulk matter of different 
elements (bhuta) have distinct qualifying 
properties: water, fire, air and earth re-
spectively, those of taste, colour, touch 
and odour. These qualities must ulti-
mately arise, via inherence, from those of 
their respective atoms. Thus there must 
be a distinctive characteristic (visesa 
guna) in each atom that differentiates  
atoms of one variety from those of  
another (note 15). A point to note here is 
that in the Jain atomism, all the four 
gunas are attributed to each atom; since 
in this tradition there is only one type of 
atom. A striking fact about Vaisesika 
doctrine is that not only are atoms  
belonging to distinct classes different 
from each other; even different atoms in 
one and the same class are asserted to be 
so. Thus an atom is believed to be  
endowed with a kind of individuality. 
Actually, the idea is not as esoteric as it 
appears. To take a modern analogy, it is 
true in the classical Boltzman statistics, 
where identical particles are distinguish-
able. The property is no longer valid in 
quantum statistics – Bose–Einstein or 
Fermi–Diract. 
 Vaisesika does not require the atoms 
to be necessarily in perpetual motion. 
This is in contrast to the position of Epi-
curus–Lucretius. Recall that motion was 
essential in the latter scheme; since it is 
motion that led to collisions that, in turn, 
led to the formation, via interlocking, of 
more complex structures. This may very 
well be due to Greek reluctance to accept 
the idea of action-at-distance. How does 
Vaisesika explain the formation of more 
complex structures out of individual  
atoms? Vaisesika asserts the presence of 
two factors. The first is a physical prop-
erty residing in atoms themselves that 
propels two of the same type to form bi-
naries, three binaries to form a triad, and 
so on. In other words, atoms possess an 
innate propensity to aggregate. This idea 
is thus a forerunner of the modern con-
cept of van der Waal forces. The second 
factor involved is an unseen principle 
(adrishta) – a vague and somewhat meta-
physical concept that seems totally out of 
place with the rationalist teachings of 
Vaisesika. It is most likely that this did 
not form part of the original doctrine and 
is a later insertion. Actually, very little of 
Kanada’s original work survives; what 
we have today is attributions, together 
with commentaries from later members 
of the Vaisesika tradition, most notably 
from Prasastapada (6th century CE). There 
is another angle to this phenomenon of 
retreat from rationalism. Recall that In-
dian cosmography is one of periodic dis-
solution (pralaya) and reconstitution 
taking place indefinitely. Vaisesika doc-
trine adds a gloss to this picture. At pra-
laya, the bond between atoms is broken. 
We now have a collection of isolated, in-
dividual atoms; as such the world is be-
yond perception. In this state, the natural 
tendency of atoms to congregate is be-
lieved to be suspended. What then causes 
the reinstatement of the atomic tendency 
to congregate and form more complex 
structures? Here the  
unseen principle comes in handy. As one 
can guess, this principle would eventu-
ally be elevated to the status of a divine 
will. Indeed, Udayana (950 CE) con-
structed ‘a proof of the existence of God’ 
on this basis. If nothing else, this situa-
tion mirrors the sad decline of rationa-
lism together with the concomitant rise 
of theism in the Indian intellectual tradi-
tion. 
 Atomic doctrine also appears in the 
Naya sutra of Aksapada Gautama, al-
though this work is more concerned with 
logic14. The Buddhist world-view also 
involves atomism. Atoms are of four 
types, namely those of air, water, fire and 
earth, as in Vaisesika. However, a point 
of difference between the Buddhist and 
the Vaisesika doctrines ought to be 
noted10. In the Buddhist view a compos-
ite body is looked upon as a mere aggre-
gate of its constituent atoms (note 16)7. 
In contrast, Vaisesika (also the atomism 
of the Jains) recognize the existence of 
properties of the composite body that re-
sult from the manner in which the atoms 
are put together and organized. We can 
easily see the difference between these 
two views by considering the case of 
(liquid) water versus (solid) ice. Both are 
made of water atoms, but the bulk mate-
rial has, quite obviously, distinct proper-
ties. Thus Vaisesika is a more developed 
scheme. This also strengthens the case 
that Vaisesika came after the Buddha. 
 Although our understanding, as to 
what the ultimate constituents of matter 
are, has evolved and changed in the 
course of the last two millennia, the idea 
itself has proved to be resilient and cor-
rect. In this sense, the atomic hypothesis 
is perhaps the most remarkable idea of 
premodern times. The ancients did not 
have the ability to perform controlled 
experiments; nor did they possess the 
mathematical tools adequate to address 
this issue. Despite these limitations, 
through a combination of imagination 
and reasoning, they stumbled on the idea 
of atoms – an idea whose validity has 
been established in the course of the last 
century and more. 
 Where do we stand today? The ulti-
mate constituents of matter are believed 
to be the following: the six leptons, six 
(triplets) quarks and particles that trans-
mit forces between them. The latter are 
four carriers of electroweak forces, the 
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eight gluons that carry strong forces  
between quarks and finally, the Higgs 
boson that is needed to implement the 
theoretical scheme of broken gauge 
symmetry. It is not entirely clear if gravi-
ton, the hypothetical particle that could 
carry gravitational forces, should or 
should not be included in the list of ele-
mentary entities. This is because it is  
not certain that the gravitational field, 
described by the (nonlinear) Einstein 
field equations, can be quantized, in a 
mathematically consistent way. In any 
case, our ultimate entities do not all pos-
sess the properties that the ancients  
attributed to their atoms. Thus, not all of 
them are indestructible; only some are, 
the rest undergo spontaneous decay. 
What about visibility? We should first 
reinterpret the word to mean not just the 
ability to detect with our sense organs, 
but more generally to observe via modern 
scientific instruments. Then only quarks 
and gluons are invisible (note 17), the 
rest are visible. 
Notes 
 1. Heraclitus is more famous for his dialec-
tical logic: All things are in perpetual 
flux; everything comes into being, yet 
forthwith ceases to be. This doctrine is 
strikingly similar to the one Sunyata  
developed later by the Buddhist Nagar-
juna (200 CE). 
 2. Almost two and a half millennia later, 
Heraclitean dialectics would be revived 
by Hegel and then by Marx and his fol-
lowers to develop the concept of dialectic 
materialism. 
 3. In Chuang Tzu, composed in the 4th cen-
tury BCE by Chuang Chao, it is suggested 
that water is the primary element. 
 4. See the article by W.C. Archer in ref. 5. 
 5. In the British Museum. Reproduced in the 
book by Bor and Reschke6. 
 6. Translated from Pali by T.W. Rhys 
Davids under the heading Dialogues of 
the Buddha (three volumes) (ref. 8). 
 7. Since Ajatsatru ascended the throne at 
Magadha (after committing patricide), in 
493 BCE (ref. 9) and died in 461 BCE, 
whereas the Buddha died in 486 BCE,  
Pakuda must have flourished during the 
period 493–486 BCE. 
 8. Mahavira means the great hero, so named 
because he struggled against and tri-
umphed over his own inhibitions and 
temptations, needed to become free to 
lead the life of an ascetic renunciate. 
 9. The smallest unit of life. 
10. A strikingly similar concept was deve-
loped by the Greek philosopher Anaxa-
gorous (born 500 BCE). Mind (nous) is a 
substance that enters into the composition 
of living things. It is the source of all mo-
tion. One point of difference should be 
noted here. Anaxagorous believed that 
matter is infinitely divisible, i.e. non-
atomic. 
11. It might be instructive to revisit the six 
heterodox preachers mentioned in the 
Digha Nikaya. King Ajatsatru of Raja-
griha asked the same question to each of 
them: Is there an immediate fruit, visible 
in this very world, of the life of a recluse? 
None of the six answered the question di-
rectly, but propounded their respective 
philosophy instead. It would thus appear 
that the common unsaid answer was sim-
ply that the reward was in the knowledge 
they had discovered.  
12. This is apparently connected with the 
ethical principle of free will (as against 
determinism). 
13. A beautiful poetic description of the ten 
stages of this evolution is presented in 
Jayadeva’s Gita Govindam. Here the 
‘spirit of the Lord’ is manifested first as a 
fish, next as a turtle, then as a wild boar 
and so on till the human stage is reached 
(ref. 13). 
14. Indian revolutionary and comintern (com-
munist international) functionary, who 
grew disillusioned and severed connection 
with the communist movement. Founded 
the Radical Humanist Movement in India. 
However, he remained a Marxist. 
15. Vaisesika is derived from visesa meaning 
particular, distinctive. 
16. The connection between a composite 
body and its constituents is also discussed 
in the work Milindapanha, which summa-
rizes the conversations between King 
Menander and the Buddhist monk  
Nagasena. Menander was the Greek king 
of Punjab. According to Nagasena, a body 
is no more than the sum total of its parts 
(ref. 7). 
17 It is believed (but not proved) that quarks 
and gluons are permanently confined in-
side hadrons. In other words, asymptotic 
states of single particles for quarks or 
gluons do not exist.  
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